Politics Thread!
Re: Politics Thread!
The global financial crisis, it is now clear, was caused not just by the bankers' colossal mismanagement. No, it was due also to the new financial complexity offering up the opportunity for widespread, systemic fraud. Friday's announcement that the world's most famous investment bank, Goldman Sachs, is to face civil charges for fraud brought by the American regulator is but the latest of a series of investigations that have been launched, arrests made and charges made against financial institutions around the world. Big Finance in the 21st century turns out to have been Big Fraud. Yet Britain, centre of the world financial system, has not yet levelled charges against any bank; all that we've seen is the allegation of a high-level insider dealing ring which, embarrassingly, involves a banker advising the government. We have to live with the fiction that our banks and bankers are whiter than white, and any attempt to investigate them and their institutions will lead to a mass exodus to the mountains of Switzerland. The politicians of the Labour and Tory party alike are Bambis amid the wolves.
Just consider the roll call beyond Goldman Sachs. In Ireland Sean FitzPatrick, the ex-chair of the Anglo Irish bank was arrested last month and questioned over alleged fraud. In Iceland last week a dossier assembled by its parliament on the Icelandic banks – huge lenders in Britain – was handed to its public prosecution service. A court-appointed examiner found that collapsed investment bank Lehman knowingly manipulated its balance sheet to make it look stronger than it was – accounts originally audited by the British firm Ernst and Young and given the legal green light by the British firm Linklaters. In Switzerland UBS has been defending itself from the US's Internal Revenue Service for allegedly running 17,000 offshore accounts to evade tax. Be sure there are more revelations to come – except in saintly Britain.
Beneath the complexity, the charges are all rooted in the same phenomenon – deception. Somebody, somewhere, was knowingly fooled by banks and bankers – sometimes governments over tax, sometimes regulators and investors over the probity of balance sheets and profits and sometimes, as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) says in Goldman's case, by creating a scheme to enrich one favoured investor at the expense of others – including, via RBS, the British taxpayer. Along the way there is a long list of so-called "entrepreneurs" and "innovators" who were offered loans that should never have been made. Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman's CEO, remarked only semi-ironically that his bank was doing God's work. He must wake up every day bitterly regretting the words ever emerged from his mouth.
For the Goldmans case is in some ways the most damaging. The Icelandic banks, Anglo Irish bank and Lehman were all involved in opaque deals and rank bad lending decisions – but Goldman allegedly went one step further, according to the SEC actively creating a financial instrument that transferred wealth to one favoured client from others less favoured. If the Securities and Exchange Commission's case is proved – and it is aggressively rebutted by Goldman – the charge is that Goldman's vice-president Fabrice Tourre created a dud financial instrument packed with valueless sub- prime mortgages at the instruction of hedge fund client Paulson, sold it to investors knowing it was valueless, and then allowed Paulson to profit from the dud financial instrument. Goldman says the buyers were "among the most sophisticated mortgage investors" in the world. But this is a used car salesman flogging a broken car he's got from some wide-boy pal to some driver who can't get access to the log-book. Except it was lionised as financial innovation.
The investors who bought the collateralised debt obligation (CDO) were not complete innocents. They had asked for the bond to be validated by an independent expert into residential mortgage-backed securities – a company called ACA management. ACA gave the bond the thumbs-up on the understanding from Fabrice Tourre that the hedge fund Paulson were investing in it. But the SEC says Tourre misled them, a pivotal claim that Goldman denies. The reality was that Paulson was frantically buying credit default swaps in the CDO that would go up in price the more valueless it became – a trade that would make more than $1 billion. Worse, Paulson had identified some of the dud sub-prime mortgages that he wanted Tourre to put into the CDO. If the SEC case is true, this was a scam – nothing more, nothing less.
Tourre could see what was coming. In one email in January 2007 he wrote: "More and more leverage in the system. The whole building is about to collapse anytime now… only potential survivor, the fabulous Fab[rice Tourre] .. standing in the middle of all these complex highly leveraged exotic trades he created without necessarily understanding all of the implications of those monstrosities". Fabulous Fab, like his boss, will not be feeling very fab today.
The cases not only have a lot in common – using financial complexity allegedly to deceive and then using so-called independent experts to validate the deception (lawyers, accountants, credit rating agencies, "portfolio selection agents," etc etc ) – but they also show how interconnected the financial system is. In Iceland Citigroup and Deutsche Bank covered the margin calls of distressed Icelandic business borrowers, deepening the crisis. Lehman uses the lightly regulated London markets and two independent British experts to validate that their "Repo 105s" were "genuine" trades and not their own in-house liability. The American authorities pursued a Swiss bank over aiding and abetting US nationals to evade tax.
Bankers will complain these cases all involve one or two misguided individuals, but that most banking is above board and was just the victim of irrational exuberance, misguided belief in free market economics and faulty risk management techniques. Obviously that is true – but, sadly, there is much more to the crisis. Andrew Haldane, executive director of the Bank of England, highlights the remarkable reduction in the risk weighting of bank assets between 1997 and 2007. Put simply, Europe's and the US's large banks exploited the weak international agreement on bank capital requirements in the so-called Basel agreement in 2004 to reclassify the risk of their loans and trading instruments. They did not just reduce the risk by 5 or 10%. Breathtakingly, they claimed their new risk management techniques were so wonderful that the riskiness of their assets was up to half of what it had been – despite property and share prices cresting to new all-time highs.
Brutally, the banks knowingly gamed the system to grow their balance sheets ever faster and with even less capital underpinning them in the full knowledge that everything rested on the bogus claim that their lending was now much less risky. That was not all they were doing. As Michael Lewis describes in The Big Short, credit default swaps had been deliberately created as an asset class by the big investment banks to allow hedge funds to speculate against collateralised debt obligations. The banks were gaming the regulators and investors alike – and they knew full well what they were doing. Simon Johnson's 13 Bankers shows how the major American banks deployed vast political lobbying power and money to create the relaxed regulatory environment in which all this could take place. In Britain no money changed hands. Gordon Brown offered light-touch regulation for free – egged on by the Tories, who wanted to go further.
This was the context in which Goldman's Fabulous Fab created the disputed CDOs, Sean FitzPatrick allegedly moved loans between banks and Lehman created its Repo 105s along with the entire "debt mule" structure revealed this weekend of inter-related companies to shuffle debt around its empire. London and New York had become the centre of an international financial system in which the purpose of banking became making money from money – and where the complexity of the "innovations" allowed extensive fraud and deception.
Now it has all collapsed, to be bailed out by western taxpayers. The banks are resisting reform – and want to cling on to the business practices and business model that has so appallingly failed. It is obvious why: it makes them very rich. The politicians tread carefully, only proposing what the bankers say is congruent with their definition of what banking should be. Labour and Tories alike are united in opposing improved EU regulation of hedge funds, buying the propaganda those operations had nothing to do with the crisis. Perhaps Paulson's trades at Goldman, and the hedge funds' appetite for speculating in credit default swaps, may disabuse them.
It is time to reframe the question. Banks and financial institutions should do what economy and society want them to do – support enterprise, direct credit to where it is needed and be part of the system that generates investment and innovation. Andrew Haldane – and the governor of the Bank of England – are right. We need to break up our banks, limit their capacity to speculate and bring them back to earth. Britain should also launch an official investigation into what went wrong – and hand the findings to the Serious Fraud Office. This needs to become this election campaign's number one issue – not one which either a compromised Labour party or a temporising Conservative party will relish. The Lib Dems, the fiercest critics of the banks, have begun to get very lucky.
Crisis timetable
September 2007 Funding problems at Northern Rock triggers the first run on a British bank. It is nationalised in February 2008.
April 2008 Bear Stern faces bankruptcy after a run on the company wipes out cash reserves in less than two days. Backed by the Federal Reserve, JPMorgan buys up shares at far below market value.
September 2008 Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy protection, becoming the first major bank to collapse since the start of the credit crisis.
December 2008 Bernard Madoff arrested for operating the largest Ponzi scheme in history.
January 2009 The Bank of England launches £200bn quantitative easing.
March 2010 Former chairman of Anglo Irish bank Sean Fitzpatrick is arrested in Dublin after failing to disclose details of loans worth millions from the bank.
April 2010 Northern Rock former directors, David Baker and Richard Barclay, are fined £504,000 and £140,000 for deliberately misleading analysts prior to nationalisation.
April 2010 The US Securities and Exchange Commission accuses Goldman Sachs of "defrauding investors by misstating and omitting key facts".
Joanna Aniel Bidar
• This article was amended on Monday 19 April and Tuesday 20 April. A reference to Anglo Irish looking after the Post Office's financial services was removed. Bank of Ireland is the Post Office's financial services provider. The original also referred to the US Inland Revenue Service. This has been corrected.
Just consider the roll call beyond Goldman Sachs. In Ireland Sean FitzPatrick, the ex-chair of the Anglo Irish bank was arrested last month and questioned over alleged fraud. In Iceland last week a dossier assembled by its parliament on the Icelandic banks – huge lenders in Britain – was handed to its public prosecution service. A court-appointed examiner found that collapsed investment bank Lehman knowingly manipulated its balance sheet to make it look stronger than it was – accounts originally audited by the British firm Ernst and Young and given the legal green light by the British firm Linklaters. In Switzerland UBS has been defending itself from the US's Internal Revenue Service for allegedly running 17,000 offshore accounts to evade tax. Be sure there are more revelations to come – except in saintly Britain.
Beneath the complexity, the charges are all rooted in the same phenomenon – deception. Somebody, somewhere, was knowingly fooled by banks and bankers – sometimes governments over tax, sometimes regulators and investors over the probity of balance sheets and profits and sometimes, as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) says in Goldman's case, by creating a scheme to enrich one favoured investor at the expense of others – including, via RBS, the British taxpayer. Along the way there is a long list of so-called "entrepreneurs" and "innovators" who were offered loans that should never have been made. Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman's CEO, remarked only semi-ironically that his bank was doing God's work. He must wake up every day bitterly regretting the words ever emerged from his mouth.
For the Goldmans case is in some ways the most damaging. The Icelandic banks, Anglo Irish bank and Lehman were all involved in opaque deals and rank bad lending decisions – but Goldman allegedly went one step further, according to the SEC actively creating a financial instrument that transferred wealth to one favoured client from others less favoured. If the Securities and Exchange Commission's case is proved – and it is aggressively rebutted by Goldman – the charge is that Goldman's vice-president Fabrice Tourre created a dud financial instrument packed with valueless sub- prime mortgages at the instruction of hedge fund client Paulson, sold it to investors knowing it was valueless, and then allowed Paulson to profit from the dud financial instrument. Goldman says the buyers were "among the most sophisticated mortgage investors" in the world. But this is a used car salesman flogging a broken car he's got from some wide-boy pal to some driver who can't get access to the log-book. Except it was lionised as financial innovation.
The investors who bought the collateralised debt obligation (CDO) were not complete innocents. They had asked for the bond to be validated by an independent expert into residential mortgage-backed securities – a company called ACA management. ACA gave the bond the thumbs-up on the understanding from Fabrice Tourre that the hedge fund Paulson were investing in it. But the SEC says Tourre misled them, a pivotal claim that Goldman denies. The reality was that Paulson was frantically buying credit default swaps in the CDO that would go up in price the more valueless it became – a trade that would make more than $1 billion. Worse, Paulson had identified some of the dud sub-prime mortgages that he wanted Tourre to put into the CDO. If the SEC case is true, this was a scam – nothing more, nothing less.
Tourre could see what was coming. In one email in January 2007 he wrote: "More and more leverage in the system. The whole building is about to collapse anytime now… only potential survivor, the fabulous Fab[rice Tourre] .. standing in the middle of all these complex highly leveraged exotic trades he created without necessarily understanding all of the implications of those monstrosities". Fabulous Fab, like his boss, will not be feeling very fab today.
The cases not only have a lot in common – using financial complexity allegedly to deceive and then using so-called independent experts to validate the deception (lawyers, accountants, credit rating agencies, "portfolio selection agents," etc etc ) – but they also show how interconnected the financial system is. In Iceland Citigroup and Deutsche Bank covered the margin calls of distressed Icelandic business borrowers, deepening the crisis. Lehman uses the lightly regulated London markets and two independent British experts to validate that their "Repo 105s" were "genuine" trades and not their own in-house liability. The American authorities pursued a Swiss bank over aiding and abetting US nationals to evade tax.
Bankers will complain these cases all involve one or two misguided individuals, but that most banking is above board and was just the victim of irrational exuberance, misguided belief in free market economics and faulty risk management techniques. Obviously that is true – but, sadly, there is much more to the crisis. Andrew Haldane, executive director of the Bank of England, highlights the remarkable reduction in the risk weighting of bank assets between 1997 and 2007. Put simply, Europe's and the US's large banks exploited the weak international agreement on bank capital requirements in the so-called Basel agreement in 2004 to reclassify the risk of their loans and trading instruments. They did not just reduce the risk by 5 or 10%. Breathtakingly, they claimed their new risk management techniques were so wonderful that the riskiness of their assets was up to half of what it had been – despite property and share prices cresting to new all-time highs.
Brutally, the banks knowingly gamed the system to grow their balance sheets ever faster and with even less capital underpinning them in the full knowledge that everything rested on the bogus claim that their lending was now much less risky. That was not all they were doing. As Michael Lewis describes in The Big Short, credit default swaps had been deliberately created as an asset class by the big investment banks to allow hedge funds to speculate against collateralised debt obligations. The banks were gaming the regulators and investors alike – and they knew full well what they were doing. Simon Johnson's 13 Bankers shows how the major American banks deployed vast political lobbying power and money to create the relaxed regulatory environment in which all this could take place. In Britain no money changed hands. Gordon Brown offered light-touch regulation for free – egged on by the Tories, who wanted to go further.
This was the context in which Goldman's Fabulous Fab created the disputed CDOs, Sean FitzPatrick allegedly moved loans between banks and Lehman created its Repo 105s along with the entire "debt mule" structure revealed this weekend of inter-related companies to shuffle debt around its empire. London and New York had become the centre of an international financial system in which the purpose of banking became making money from money – and where the complexity of the "innovations" allowed extensive fraud and deception.
Now it has all collapsed, to be bailed out by western taxpayers. The banks are resisting reform – and want to cling on to the business practices and business model that has so appallingly failed. It is obvious why: it makes them very rich. The politicians tread carefully, only proposing what the bankers say is congruent with their definition of what banking should be. Labour and Tories alike are united in opposing improved EU regulation of hedge funds, buying the propaganda those operations had nothing to do with the crisis. Perhaps Paulson's trades at Goldman, and the hedge funds' appetite for speculating in credit default swaps, may disabuse them.
It is time to reframe the question. Banks and financial institutions should do what economy and society want them to do – support enterprise, direct credit to where it is needed and be part of the system that generates investment and innovation. Andrew Haldane – and the governor of the Bank of England – are right. We need to break up our banks, limit their capacity to speculate and bring them back to earth. Britain should also launch an official investigation into what went wrong – and hand the findings to the Serious Fraud Office. This needs to become this election campaign's number one issue – not one which either a compromised Labour party or a temporising Conservative party will relish. The Lib Dems, the fiercest critics of the banks, have begun to get very lucky.
Crisis timetable
September 2007 Funding problems at Northern Rock triggers the first run on a British bank. It is nationalised in February 2008.
April 2008 Bear Stern faces bankruptcy after a run on the company wipes out cash reserves in less than two days. Backed by the Federal Reserve, JPMorgan buys up shares at far below market value.
September 2008 Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy protection, becoming the first major bank to collapse since the start of the credit crisis.
December 2008 Bernard Madoff arrested for operating the largest Ponzi scheme in history.
January 2009 The Bank of England launches £200bn quantitative easing.
March 2010 Former chairman of Anglo Irish bank Sean Fitzpatrick is arrested in Dublin after failing to disclose details of loans worth millions from the bank.
April 2010 Northern Rock former directors, David Baker and Richard Barclay, are fined £504,000 and £140,000 for deliberately misleading analysts prior to nationalisation.
April 2010 The US Securities and Exchange Commission accuses Goldman Sachs of "defrauding investors by misstating and omitting key facts".
Joanna Aniel Bidar
• This article was amended on Monday 19 April and Tuesday 20 April. A reference to Anglo Irish looking after the Post Office's financial services was removed. Bank of Ireland is the Post Office's financial services provider. The original also referred to the US Inland Revenue Service. This has been corrected.
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Re: Politics Thread!
The law on this though is very clear. If you have a job, and get a salary, you are contractually entitled to it. Even if a firm is broke they have to pay you. If they do not have the money the government compensation scheme will pay you up to a limit.(o)(o) wrote:One of many examples :
Northern Rock boss David Baker was issued a £500k "sanction" equivalent to single years basic salary. Going forward he retains his £4.3million pension, £720k house, and whatever wealth he has already accumulated.
Criminal proceedings? NONE.
This is to protect workers as otherwise all sorts of firms might think it fair to dock people’s pay for e.g. shortfalls in the till, or for company losses on their watch. It is open to abuse: fraudsters can set themselves up as a company which pays them a large salary. Then if they are found out the company is closed down but they get to keep whatever the company has paid them.
The global financial crisis happened because of debt, or leverage in economic terms. Mortgage and property debt in the US, Spain and Ireland. Debt within the financial system, in Iceland, the US and UK. Government borrowing in the US, UK and Greece. And inter-goverment borrowing within the EU. None of these was individually enough, but happening at the same time they provoked a global crisis. There was very little fraud, or what there was was incidental, only coming to light as scrutiny fell on firms. It was all about leverage. I think I linked to this before but it’s a good piece with a nice summary:
Over the past few months, debate on the global economy has been dominated by news from Greece and China. In my view, these should not been seen as independent events, as lightning bolts from the blue. Rather, they are part of a connected sequence of financial disturbances that have hit the global economic and financial system over the past decade.
Recent events form the latest leg of what might be called a three-part crisis trilogy. Part One of that trilogy was the “Anglo-Saxon” crisis of 2008/09. Part Two was the “Euro-Area” crisis of 2011/12. And we may now be entering the early stages of Part Three of the trilogy, the “Emerging Market” crisis of 2015 onwards.
This trilogy has a common storyline. The three crisis legs have common cause in a large slug of global liquidity. As this has rotated around the international financial system, it has by turns inflated then deflated capital flows, credit, asset prices and growth in different markets and regions. That pattern characterised the first and second legs of the crisis (Wolf (2014)). And the embryonic third leg has many of the same ingredients.
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Re: Politics Thread!
So, the Isle of Man is to blame?pogo wrote:Over the past few months, debate on the global economy has been dominated by news from Greece and China. In my view, these should not been seen as independent events, as lightning bolts from the blue. Rather, they are part of a connected sequence of financial disturbances that have hit the global economic and financial system over the past decade.
Recent events form the latest leg of what might be called a three-part crisis trilogy. Part One of that trilogy was the “Anglo-Saxon” crisis of 2008/09. Part Two was the “Euro-Area” crisis of 2011/12. And we may now be entering the early stages of Part Three of the trilogy, the “Emerging Market” crisis of 2015 onwards.
This trilogy has a common storyline. The three crisis legs have common cause in a large slug of global liquidity. As this has rotated around the international financial system, it has by turns inflated then deflated capital flows, credit, asset prices and growth in different markets and regions. That pattern characterised the first and second legs of the crisis (Wolf (2014)). And the embryonic third leg has many of the same ingredients.
"My way is the way of not fighting":- the book of Enter the Dragon.
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Re: Politics Thread!
No-one is. Or at least not criminally and morally responsible, as some seem to think. The bankers who fucked up were mostly just doing their job, and if they had not then someone else would. It was not just one or two banks that failed but hundreds:
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/fa ... klist.html
It was a systemic failure. We saw so few bank failures as we have so few banks. During the crisis all but one of our major banks needed government help of some form.
Politicians are of course ultimately responsible, but our way of dealing with them is far more effective than criminal prosecution. We can vote them out. And we did, in 2010, we kicked out the main architects of our crash, in particular the one who declared repeatedly there would be no return to boom and bust.
But is wrong to try and assign criminal or moral responsibility. Not only is it unfair but it stops you finding solutions. See e.g. the eurozone. Listen to Germans and you would think the crisis is due to moral failings on the part of Southern European countries and people. Hence the pressure on them to pay their dues and pay off their debts.
But the crisis is really due to bad investments made by primarily German banks, who are at least as responsible. Ultimately though the cause is the design of the euro, which was flawed from the start for political reasons. The only way to fix it is reform the system. The problem though is the EU and eurozone operate by consensus, which means those who benefit most from the system, e.g. the Germans have effective veto.
China’s anti corruption drive is a bit like that too. It is right to go after them as they are real criminals. But it is much more important to reform the system, to eliminate large scale corruption. The problem is the CCP derives its power and authority from the current system, so real reform seems out of the question, at least while the communists are in power.
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/fa ... klist.html
It was a systemic failure. We saw so few bank failures as we have so few banks. During the crisis all but one of our major banks needed government help of some form.
Politicians are of course ultimately responsible, but our way of dealing with them is far more effective than criminal prosecution. We can vote them out. And we did, in 2010, we kicked out the main architects of our crash, in particular the one who declared repeatedly there would be no return to boom and bust.
But is wrong to try and assign criminal or moral responsibility. Not only is it unfair but it stops you finding solutions. See e.g. the eurozone. Listen to Germans and you would think the crisis is due to moral failings on the part of Southern European countries and people. Hence the pressure on them to pay their dues and pay off their debts.
But the crisis is really due to bad investments made by primarily German banks, who are at least as responsible. Ultimately though the cause is the design of the euro, which was flawed from the start for political reasons. The only way to fix it is reform the system. The problem though is the EU and eurozone operate by consensus, which means those who benefit most from the system, e.g. the Germans have effective veto.
China’s anti corruption drive is a bit like that too. It is right to go after them as they are real criminals. But it is much more important to reform the system, to eliminate large scale corruption. The problem is the CCP derives its power and authority from the current system, so real reform seems out of the question, at least while the communists are in power.
Re: Politics Thread!
How come someone be so wrong, so often ?pogo wrote:No-one is. Or at least not criminally and morally responsible, as some seem to think...... is (sic) wrong to try and assign criminal or moral responsibility.

Obviously watered down so obedient little apologists for institutionalised corruption need not worry about justice being served.http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/122774/criminal-liability-for-senior-bankers wrote:Banking Reform Legislation
The backdrop to the introduction of the new legislation was the widespread belief that the 2008 financial meltdown was caused by negligent failures in bank governance. In response to calls for a complete overhaul of the regulatory regime for banks, two commissions were set up by the UK government between 2010 and 2012: the Independent Commission on Banking and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (the ‘PCBS’). Both were extremely critical of the regulatory regime in place and recommended a raft of changes to rectify what the PCBS report referred to as ‘profound lapses of banking standards’. One recurring feature of their reports was a criticism of the lack of attribution of individual guilt for the bank failures. In other words, the commissions saw the financial meltdown as having stemmed as much from the failure of individuals to make properly considered decisions as from systemic failures. This recognition echoed calls from regulators for new prosecutorial tools. As far back as 2011, Richard Alderman, the then director of the Serious Fraud Office commented that there was the need to introduce ‘some kind of offence of being involved with recklessly running or being involved in the running of a financial institution’. With that in mind, a central theme of the PCBS’s final report in June 2013 was ‘to make individual responsibility in banking a reality’ and among other things, it stated that that there was ‘a strong case in principle for a new criminal offence of reckless misconduct in the management of a bank’. The report added that such an offence would provide regulators with a tool to prosecute the most egregious of failings, ‘such as where a bank failed with substantial costs to the taxpayer, lasting consequences for the financial system, or serious harm to customers.’
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Re: Politics Thread!
The amazing dreamworld of bankers acting "in good faith " :-


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Re: Politics Thread!
It was widely known and reported that the US housing market was in in serious trouble long before 2008, it was hardly a secret. Why did they do it, knowing it would collapse? Partly because few predicted the scale. Previous housing market collapses in the US had always been regional, so the national effect had been limited, so losses in one part of the country were covered by profits in others. Partly as they were happy to make money until the crash. And partly as many simply believed it would be different this time – like Gordon Brown here they thought the boom-bust cycles were no more.
Mostly it was the herd mentality that such markets acquire. In market bubbles you often find ordinary people join in for fear of being left behind. That fear is even greater in firms. If someone withdrew their money but the market kept rising they would look silly. If their job depends on their investment performance they might lose it. But no-one got fired for doing the same as everyone else. So everyone even if they had their doubts kept investing in the housing bubble.
Mostly it was the herd mentality that such markets acquire. In market bubbles you often find ordinary people join in for fear of being left behind. That fear is even greater in firms. If someone withdrew their money but the market kept rising they would look silly. If their job depends on their investment performance they might lose it. But no-one got fired for doing the same as everyone else. So everyone even if they had their doubts kept investing in the housing bubble.
Re: Politics Thread!
And yet you still believe that "market forces" are the way to go. You state that we "voted out" the "architects of our own crash" - a crash which was global, of course - and yet we voted in more of the same.
The politicians were the one who, somehow, pulled off a save. At enormous long-term cost to us, but they pulled off a save. They couldn't do otherwise. The alternative was to let the banks fail, to crash the economy entirely, to have politicians and bankers swinging from lampposts. Parties no longer mattered, it was save the economy or have people starving.
The ones responsible for the crash were the bankers. They were allowed to do it by market-crazed politicians from the Thatcher & Reagan period onwards, but the ones who actually did it were bankers.
Any you?
You're a fucking idiot.
The politicians were the one who, somehow, pulled off a save. At enormous long-term cost to us, but they pulled off a save. They couldn't do otherwise. The alternative was to let the banks fail, to crash the economy entirely, to have politicians and bankers swinging from lampposts. Parties no longer mattered, it was save the economy or have people starving.
The ones responsible for the crash were the bankers. They were allowed to do it by market-crazed politicians from the Thatcher & Reagan period onwards, but the ones who actually did it were bankers.
Any you?
You're a fucking idiot.
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Re: Politics Thread!
It is interesting that the right-wing advocates "there is no society, there is only the individual"...
...right up until they fuck everything up, then it's "there is no individual responsibility, you see, it's the system itself!".
...right up until they fuck everything up, then it's "there is no individual responsibility, you see, it's the system itself!".
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Re: Politics Thread!
And why did the US housing market collapse?pogo wrote:It was widely known and reported that the US housing market was in in serious trouble long before 2008, it was hardly a secret. Why did they do it, knowing it would collapse? Partly because few predicted the scale. Previous housing market collapses in the US had always been regional, so the national effect had been limited, so losses in one part of the country were covered by profits in others. Partly as they were happy to make money until the crash. And partly as many simply believed it would be different this time – like Gordon Brown here they thought the boom-bust cycles were no more.
Mostly it was the herd mentality that such markets acquire. In market bubbles you often find ordinary people join in for fear of being left behind. That fear is even greater in firms. If someone withdrew their money but the market kept rising they would look silly. If their job depends on their investment performance they might lose it. But no-one got fired for doing the same as everyone else. So everyone even if they had their doubts kept investing in the housing bubble.
Because of two mechanisms in the system.
1. The ability to buy and sell debt, creating a whole new market.
2. The inherent GAMBLING, for example on selling a share "short" or speculating on company results.
The mortgage companies lending to people who would not be able to pay back (the sub-prime market) was a huge mistake caused by greed and an incessant clamouring for growth.
Steady growth would have been fine and could have led to the end of boom & bust cycles.
Instead we are left with a huge deficit caused by bailing out the failing banks.
And the Tories have chosen to reduce that by taking money away from the poorest while simultaneously giving tax cuts to the rich - and all the while, there is no stricter regulation of the banks and the behaviours that caused the credit crunch in the first place.
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Re: Politics Thread!
It does stem back to Thatcher and the beginnngs of "neoliberalism", which has nothing to do with the liberalism of yore which had it's virtue - this is instead a perversion of values which would make Adam Smith vomit.tufty wrote:And yet you still believe that "market forces" are the way to go. You state that we "voted out" the "architects of our own crash" - a crash which was global, of course - and yet we voted in more of the same.
The politicians were the one who, somehow, pulled off a save. At enormous long-term cost to us, but they pulled off a save. They couldn't do otherwise. The alternative was to let the banks fail, to crash the economy entirely, to have politicians and bankers swinging from lampposts. Parties no longer mattered, it was save the economy or have people starving.
The ones responsible for the crash were the bankers. They were allowed to do it by market-crazed politicians from the Thatcher & Reagan period onwards, but the ones who actually did it were bankers.
Resigned from one of the top bank's HQs in the mid 90s in disgust due to the abhorrent culture. Staff members were naming and shaming senior members within the premises at the time I left, pinning up notices around the building with information about their shady dealings.
Despite 5 years witnessing the muck spreading spewing shit into the thread, can't exclude the possibility it's an elaborate troll and/or a bitter twat who deliberately talks rubbish to get peoples hackles up.tufty wrote:Any you?
You're a fucking idiot.
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Re: Politics Thread!
The fundamental underlying problem is that deregulation allowed unprecedented leverage to be created in financial markets. More institutions were allowed to each create more money.
This has always been the jealously guarded power of the banks, that they're legally allowed to lend beyond their means to repay. This is the real systematic question underlying financial security. If there was no leverage, there would be no risk that anyone can't repay. As soon as you allow it, that risk exists, and as the leverage increases the risk grows.
The system is hugely over-leveraged at the minute, and we haven't fixed the most fundamental underlying issue that there are highly leveraged financial institutions whose failure is system threatening. That should be the key focus of current regualation: restrict the leverage of large financial institutions.
That also means there's an even more subtle effect that is extraordinarily hard to solve; to calculate how much money you are allowed to lend you need accurate values of the collateral. That was a arguably the biggest failure in the run-up to the crash, and the problem still exists now. Indeed, it's exploding to massive extent in places like London.
This has always been the jealously guarded power of the banks, that they're legally allowed to lend beyond their means to repay. This is the real systematic question underlying financial security. If there was no leverage, there would be no risk that anyone can't repay. As soon as you allow it, that risk exists, and as the leverage increases the risk grows.
The system is hugely over-leveraged at the minute, and we haven't fixed the most fundamental underlying issue that there are highly leveraged financial institutions whose failure is system threatening. That should be the key focus of current regualation: restrict the leverage of large financial institutions.
That also means there's an even more subtle effect that is extraordinarily hard to solve; to calculate how much money you are allowed to lend you need accurate values of the collateral. That was a arguably the biggest failure in the run-up to the crash, and the problem still exists now. Indeed, it's exploding to massive extent in places like London.
Re: Politics Thread!
You can dig deeper than that - to the psyche that drives for deregulation in the first place.Dio wrote:The fundamental underlying problem is that deregulation allowed unprecedented leverage to be created in financial markets.
Speaking of which.. Already mentioned the "sneaky" changes to the Ministerial Code. This is now blowing up.
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/oct ... tional-lawPaul Jenkins Treasury solicitor and head of the government legal service, 2006-14 wrote: It is disingenuous of the Cabinet Office to dismiss the changes to the ministerial code as mere tidying up. As the government’s most senior legal official I saw at close hand from 2010 onwards the intense irritation these words caused the PM as he sought to avoid complying with our international legal obligations, for example in relation to prisoner voting. Whether the new wording alters the legal obligations of ministers or not, there can be no doubt that they will regard the change as bolstering, in a most satisfying way, their contempt for the rule of international law.
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Re: Politics Thread!
Yes. The problem is not that traders were taking too many risks. That is their job, to take risks. That is what they are paid for and it what investors in their firms expect. The problem was that such risk taking was being done by systemically important banks – the big five/big four in this country. Exacerbated by the implicit guarantee of being too big to fail, which meant they could borrow more cheaply and so be even more highly leveraged than without.Dio wrote:The system is hugely over-leveraged at the minute, and we haven't fixed the most fundamental underlying issue that there are highly leveraged financial institutions whose failure is system threatening. That should be the key focus of current regualation: restrict the leverage of large financial institutions.
The fix is to unbundle the risky side of banking from the boring but systemically important side. Make sure that the boring part, the retail banking part, is isolated from the trading side so it can’t be brought down by it. The traders then can go ahead and make whatever bets they want, even ones that risk their business. Though their bets will probably be smaller stripped of the assets of a retail bank and it’s “too big to fail” guarantee.
Firms go bust all the time, there’s nothing we can do to stop it. Especially not when the business of the firm is taking risks and making bets. All we can do is ensure that such risks cannot threaten the broader economy. We certainly should not seek to criminalise people for doing their job.
Re: Politics Thread!
They are not criminalising the occupation of banking.pogo wrote:We certainly should not seek to criminalise people for doing their job.
It is misconduct that will be made criminal.
As recommended by PCBS (after extensive research), LSE, FSA.. pretty much every human person in GB in fact.
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